The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia, once close allies in regional security efforts such as the Yemen war coalition, have seen their relationship deteriorate sharply into open rivalry. Tensions boiled over in late December 2025 when the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) launched a major offensive in Yemen’s Hadhramaut and al-Mahra regions, prompting Saudi Arabia to publicly accuse the UAE of undermining its interests and the UN-recognized Yemeni government.
This escalation has involved Saudi media campaigns targeting the UAE, raising fears of a broader Gulf crisis.
The rift stems from competing visions for regional influence, particularly over strategic corridors in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa, where both states vie for control of ports, resources, and political leverage.
These tensions have solidified rival fronts in the region. Saudi Arabia leads an emerging axis that includes Egypt, Sudan, Turkey, and increasingly Somalia, focused on countering perceived threats to Red Sea stability and asserting dominance in the Horn of Africa. This grouping emphasizes cooperation on security, military coalitions, and influence over key states to limit fragmentation.
In contrast, the UAE has pursued a more autonomous path, supporting separatist entities like the STC in Yemen and maintaining strong ties in parts of the Horn, though recent setbacks—such as Somalia’s January 2026 termination of all bilateral agreements with the UAE over its dealings with Somaliland—have eroded its position.
The UAE’s maritime and economic footprint across the Red Sea and Horn now faces direct challenges from the Saudi-led bloc.
Amid this fracturing, Ethiopia stands out as a pivotal strategic partner for the UAE. Bilateral ties have deepened significantly in recent years, encompassing massive investments in infrastructure, agriculture, and ports, alongside robust security cooperation. The UAE has positioned Ethiopia as its central ally in the Horn of Africa, with high-level talks in January 2026 reaffirming a “comprehensive strategic partnership” focused on mutual defense, territorial integrity, and regional stability.
Military collaboration forms a cornerstone of this relationship. The UAE has provided critical support to Ethiopia’s armed forces, including drones and logistical aid during past conflicts. Most notably, recent reports indicate the UAE is set to donate nearly 20 Mirage 2000 multirole fighter jets to Ethiopia’s air force—a move highlighted by Emirati aircraft participation in Ethiopia’s 90th Air Force anniversary celebrations in January 2026.
Cargo flights linked to UAE arms transfers have also been tracked to Ethiopian military bases, underscoring the deepening operational ties.
Ethiopia is well-positioned to capitalize on the UAE’s setbacks. The UAE’s loss of defense and port access agreements in Somalia, combined with its strained position in Yemen against Saudi-backed forces, leaves Abu Dhabi seeking reliable partners to maintain its Red Sea influence and counter the Saudi-Egypt-Sudan-Turkey-Somalia axis.
This axis poses direct challenges to UAE interests and indirectly to Ethiopia through shared adversaries—Egypt over Nile waters, Sudan over border issues, and Turkey/Somalia over regional alignments. By leaning more heavily on Ethiopia, the UAE can secure a stable foothold in the Horn, project power against rivals, and offset its diminished leverage elsewhere.For Ethiopia, this dynamic presents strategic opportunities:
Accelerate military modernization – Prioritize integration of incoming UAE platforms like the Mirage 2000s to enhance air superiority, particularly in deterring threats from neighboring states aligned with the Saudi-led bloc.
Secure expanded economic and security aid – Leverage UAE’s need for a strong ally to negotiate larger investments in infrastructure (e.g., ports and agriculture) and defense pacts that provide training, intelligence sharing, and potential basing rights.
Diplomatic maneuvering – Position Ethiopia as a counterweight to the Saudi axis by deepening UAE ties, while carefully managing relations with other powers to avoid full polarization. This could include backchannel support for UAE objectives in Sudan or Yemen in exchange for backing on core issues like GERD and regional security.
Regional balancing – Use UAE support to strengthen negotiating positions with Egypt and Sudan, while exploring selective engagement with Saudi Arabia to prevent isolation.
In essence, the UAE-Saudi rupture has created a fluid geopolitical environment where Ethiopia’s geographic centrality and existing partnership with Abu Dhabi offer a pathway to significant gains. By strategically deepening this alliance without provoking unnecessary escalation, Ethiopia could bolster its security, economy, and influence in the Horn and Red Sea arena.